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ADAPT: A PRICE-STABILIZING COMPLIANCE POLICY
FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES:
THE CASE OF SREC MARKETS
Abstract. Currently most Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) markets are defined based on
targets which create an artificial step demand function resembling a cliff. This target policy pro-
duces volatile prices which can make investing in renewables a risky proposition. In this paper,
we propose an alternative policy called Adjustable Dynamic Assignment of Penalties and Targets
(ADAPT) which uses a sloped compliance penalty and a self-regulating requirement schedule, both
designed to stabilize REC prices, helping to alleviate a common weakness of environmental markets.
To capture market behavior, we model the market as a stochastic dynamic programming problem
to understand how the market might balance the decision to use a REC now versus holding it
for future periods (in the face of uncertain new supply). Then, we present and prove some of the
properties of this market, and finally we show that this mechanism reduces the volatility of REC
prices which should stabilize the market and encourage long-term investment in renewables.
Keywords: Compliance Policy, Renewable Energy Certificates, Stochastic Dynamic Programming,
Price Volatility, Mechanism Design
1. Introduction
To promote the use of renewable sources of energy such as wind, solar, geothermal and biomass,
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) have been implemented in a number of states in the US
and in other countries. These are sets of regulations requiring increased generation from renewable
energy sources usually by obligating Load Serving Entities (LSEs) to obtain a percentage of their
generation from renewable sources. A Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) market is one tool used
by many states to implement these policies. According to a set of regulations, certified renewable
generators are credited with RECs for each unit of electricity generated. All LSEs are required to
comply with their regulatory obligations by submitting enough RECs each Energy Year (EY), or
otherwise they are charged a penalty called the Alternative Compliance Payment (ACP) for each
REC they are short. These market-based tools are expected to provide a more efficient, competi-
tive and innovative environment for increasing renewable energy supply and decreasing the cost of
generation in comparison with other regulatory tools such as feed-in tariffs ([6, 22]).
This particular market design, however, as we discuss more extensively in the next section, can
result in undesirably volatile prices. Although REC markets incentivize investing in renewables,
excess volatility can affect the amount of investment negatively, and is thus a frequent concern of
policymakers (see e.g. [2]). Indeed, authors who advocate fixed-price environmental policy tools
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like carbon taxes often cite this weakness of market-based mechanisms (see e.g. [17]), and the Euro-
pean Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) faced heavy criticism in its early years as prices fell
rapidly towards zero. Price volatility in both REC and carbon markets is mostly attributed to the
artificial vertical demand curve imposed by regulations. A number of papers (such as [11, 3, 18, 21])
discuss extensively the problems arising from a vertical demand curve (or a cliff policy) such as an
uncompetitive market, volatile prices, higher cost of investment (due to higher risk), and difficult
policy evaluation. Various investigations have also been made into ways of reducing price volatility,
such as through banking ([20]), or by trading in financial options if available ([29]). We aim to
add to this literature with a new design for environmental markets (and for RECs in particular),
accompanied by a rigorous mathematical analysis of its implications.
In this paper, we propose an Adjustable Dynamic Assignment of Penalties and Targets (ADAPT)
policy by introducing and assessing both a sloped penalty function and an adaptive mechanism for
requirements which can adjust to supply and demand imbalances. Under this sloped penalty
proposal, the effective ACP is a function of the total submitted RECs in each energy year. While
the requirement is normally not directly a function of the submitted or generated RECs, it can also
be chosen to be a function of last year’s surplus (or shortage), a type of self-regulation implemented
in the Massachusetts SREC market already, with additional complexities linked to SREC auction
results. The slope of the penalty function and the sensitivity to last year’s surplus are both then
tunable regulatory parameters. We show in this paper that this mechanism can be used by policy
makers to dampen the volatility of market prices which should encourage long-term investment
in renewable generation. We conduct our case study of the ADAPT policy using the same solar
generation model as [8]. However, by incorporating a sloped penalty function along with banking
between years, optimal compliance decisions each period are non-trivial, requiring substantially
more analysis. Moreover, instead of modeling each vintage year separately as in [8], we adapt
the dynamic program to solve for prices simultaneously across all vintage years, over a long time
horizon. This paper makes the following key contributions:
(1) We propose an innovative and flexible regulatory policy (that we call ADAPT), which can
be used to encourage markets to achieve specific goals (e.g. energy from renewables, limiting
emissions, ethanol targets, recyclable garbage, or water usage), without the instability often
witnessed in classical “cliff” designs for pre-determined quantity targets. The ADAPT
policy is easily integrated into current markets, and represents a generalizable concept for
hitting quantitative targets. Through a set of simulated and theoretical results, we show
that ADAPT produces dramatically more stable prices than those under a cliff policy.
(2) We derive an optimal policy for submitting RECs to the market (while banking others),
which captures the collective market behavior. We describe a series of structural results to
accelerate calculations, and then prove several properties of the optimal policy, including:
(a) We demonstrate how the optimal submission under ADAPT is chosen by market par-
ticipants to balance prices through time.
(b) We show that the prices of RECs of different vintages (RECs generated in different
years) are the same under typical market conditions.
2
(c) We prove a property of the optimal solution that reduces the decision variable’s di-
mensionality across vintages to a scalar. Dimensionality of the state variable is also
shown to reduce to a scalar under certain typical conditions.
(d) We prove that the total penalty payments under the sloped policy is bounded from
below by the total payments of the cliff policy for a given submission level.
(3) We conduct extensive numerical experiments and simulations which confirm and further
illustrate the important properties of the model derived in previous sections.
While we focus on REC markets here (and specifically solar RECs, or SRECs), techniques devel-
oped here are arguably transferable to other environmental markets and even to other commodity
markets, assuming appropriate modifications or extensions. Firstly, cap-and-trade markets for car-
bon emissions are a natural link, due to their related market designs and compliance features. An
ADAPT-like framework could certainly be envisioned for such markets, and indeed the regulators of
carbon markets have recently experimented with various tools to stabilize markets, including price
floor mechanisms (e.g. California, the UK) and the new EU ETS Market Stability Reserve (starting
2018), designed to offset long-term imbalances via automatically triggered supply adjustments. To
our knowledge, the idea of a sloped alternative to a vertical demand curve has not been trialed
in REC or carbon markets. However, a similar idea was implemented in the capacity markets of
NYISO and New England ISO (see [9, 14, 26] for discussion).
While only very limited literature on stochastic modeling of SREC markets exists (see [1, 8, 16]),
carbon emissions markets have attracted much more attention (see [7, 13]), including recent studies
of the Market Stability Reserve’s likely impact on prices ([15, 19]). However, various key differences
between carbon and REC markets require careful consideration, including the opposite roles for
supply and demand, the typical ‘withdrawal’ rule reducing incentives for banking, the possibility
of unlimited banking, and the wide range of factors affecting carbon emissions abatement, notably
volatile fuel prices and power demand. We argue that SREC markets provide an excellent case
study for such modeling techniques, with simpler underlying factors (e.g., solar generation), relative
separation from other energy markets (at least for current low levels of renewables penetration)
and more transparent data facilitating empirical studies and model calibration, as performed in [8]
and [16].
Moving slightly further afield, a large literature on the ‘theory of storage’ exists for storable
physical commodities, such as agricultural, metals or energy commodities (see e.g. [25, 10]). Such
approaches, called ‘structural models’ by [24], are based on the idea of a storage decision at each
time period (often by a representative agent or social planner), and solved via dynamic program-
ming techniques. Our approach under the APADT framework here is closely linked to this class
of models, with the commodity’s consumption and storage decisions analagous to our REC sub-
mission and banking decisions, albeit with different seasonal patterns and frequencies. Different
harvests of perishable commodities are similar to different REC vintages, and the same fundamen-
tal intertemporal tradeoffs apply, namely that storing more means consuming less now, producing
higher prices now, but lower prices in the future (and less risk of future shortages). However, for
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Table 1. The current requirement and penalty levels (last changed in 2012)
Energy Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Target (% supply) 2.05% 2.45% 2.75% 3.00% 3.20% 3.29% 3.38%
Target (1000s MWh) 442 596 1,708 2,072 2,360 2,614 2,830 2,953 3,079
SACP $658 $641 $339 $331 $323 $315 $308 $300 $293
storable physical commodities, such models rely crucially on specifying an unobservable inverse
demand curve, again giving the REC case study a significant advantage since the SACP function
is set artificially by a regulator.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and discuss the market design,
regulations, and performance of the New Jersey (NJ) SREC market, including the problems result-
ing from the current market design. In Section 3, we introduce the ADAPT policy and describe
how it can be implemented. In Section 4, we formulate the collective behaviour of market partic-
ipants using a stochastic dynamic programming model. In Section 5, we characterize and prove
some of the properties of the REC markets. In Section 6, we detail our methodology for solving
this stochastic dynamic program. In Section 7, we use parameters estimated from New Jersey to
perform experiments on different aspects of the ADAPT policy in comparison to the current cliff
mechanisms. In Section 8, we provide our concluding remarks.
2. Case Application: The New Jersey SREC Market
In the US, nearly 30 states have established RPSs and some of these use multipliers (e.g. 2 or 3
credits per MWh) to specifically promote investment in solar energy. To further promote the use
of solar energy, 14 states have established separate solar set-asides and tradeable SRECs, and have
been successful in increasing investment in solar generation ([27, 28, 5, 4, 12]). The New Jersey
(NJ) SREC market is the biggest in the US, has recorded prices near $700 per SREC, and has the
most ambitious target of over 4% of electricity from solar by 2028. SREC generation has grown
very rapidly from around 30,000 SRECs in EY2007 to more than 1,000,000 in EY2013. Each energy
year represents the twelve month period ending on May 31st of the named year. Table 1 shows
the requirement (currently set in terms of percentage of overall supply, with projected absolute
numbers) and Solar ACP (SACP) levels following the 2012 rule change ([5, 23]).
The rules of the current SREC market in New Jersey can be summarized as follows:
• For each MWh of solar electricity generated, one SREC is issued to the owner of the plant.
• For several years ahead, the government sets targets for solar power consumption.
• All LSEs, primarily utilities, must meet their requirement by submitting sufficient SRECs
each year. Otherwise, they need to pay a fixed penalty (or SACP) for each MWh they fall
below the target. They are free to generate SRECs themselves or to buy from other SREC
generators.
• Finally, SRECs can be banked and used for a few years in the future. In the current NJ
SREC market, SRECs can be used for four more years in addition to their production year.
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Figure 1. Historical NJ SREC prices (left) and annual generation compared to
requirement levels (right)
Figure 1a shows historical SREC prices in NJ between 2007 and 2016, while Figure 1b shows
generation levels, and total banked supply relative to annual targets. Shortly after its introduction,
the NJ SREC market sustained very high prices close to its SACP level, as the market failed to
meet the targets. More recently, the market was characterised by oversupply in 2012-13, leading to
low prices, less new solar generation and a rule change to increase the requirement, before finally
swinging back towards undersupply very recently. Ohio and Pennsylvania SREC markets have
both also witnessed price drops from above $300 to under $50 within 18 month periods. Many
argue that a market with such volatile prices is a risky environment for investors, thus decreasing
competition and increasing cost of generation (e.g. [11]).
To reduce the volatility of SREC prices and thereby reduce the risk of solar investments, several
rule changes have been introduced in the NJ SREC market. For example, higher SACP levels and
the possibility of banking (for two years) were introduced in 2008. In 2012, the banking horizon
was extended to four years, along with increases to the targets. Frequent changes in the market
mechanism suggest that these policy adjustments have not been a long-term solution and that
market design has some room for improvement. Various possible remedies are discussed by [11],
including price floors, long-term contracts and increased banking years. These authors were also
the first to suggest the use of a downward sloping demand curve in this context. However they
do not provide details of their proposal’s implementation or any substantial analysis. Moreover
their approach differs from ours in using an exponential SACP curve that never reaches zero, thus
removing any possibility of full compliance.
3. ADAPT: A Price-stabilizing Compliance Policy
In this section, we introduce a new class of regulatory policies for computing alternative com-
pliance penalties that allows regulators to moderate or avoid excess price volatility. We provide a
description and rigorous analysis of the ADAPT market design in the context of SREC markets,
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Figure 2. Price formation for two submission scenarios x1 and x2 under ADAPT
and the cliff policy. The hashed areas represent total penalty payment in each case.
but its application could be extended to other environmental markets, such as cap-and-trade mar-
kets for emissions.
The standard compliance policy used in New Jersey and elsewhere looks like a cliff (dashed line
in Figure 2), where the full SACP is imposed per MWh if usage is less than the target, dropping
to zero if usage meets or exceeds the target. The first distinguishing feature of ADAPT is to re-
place the cliff with a downward sloping function (solid line in Figure 2), thus diminishing the large
uncertainty in penalty payments that naturally arises with a cliff-style target policy.
In Figure 2, x1 and x2 represent two scenarios of SREC submissions, one on each side of the
requirement. Resulting penalty levels p1 and p2 are vastly different, illustrating how small changes
in generation can produce high price volatility. On the other hand, with the sloped SACP function,
the same submissions x1 and x2 result in penalties p
′
1 and p
′
2 that are much closer together, pro-
viding some initial intuition as to why ADAPT produces more stable prices. Furthermore, when
transitioning to a new energy year, the probability of meeting a target may drop sharply from high
to low due to the chosen requirement schedule. The sloped SACP function can mitigate the price
impact of this problem by avoiding the binary nature of the cliff policy. Nonetheless, long-term
imbalances between supply and demand may still develop, and therefore an additional tunable
policy feature may also be incorporated to automatically redefine next year’s requirement level, as
we shall elaborate below.
The hashed gray area in Figure 2 represents total penalty payment in the current mechanism
for x1, while total penalty payment for x2 is zero. Note that the full SREC requirement under the
sloped mechanism (i.e. the right end of the sloped section) is more than the requirement of the
current mechanism and so the penalty is paid for a higher number of SRECs (but a smaller penalty
value for each unit). The hashed red and blue areas show the total penalty payment under the
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Figure 3. Sloped SACP function (left): the hashed area shows total market penalty
payment and xt represents the total submitted SRECs at the compliance time t
(t ∈ N). Adaptive requirements (right): how Rt is calculated from the fixed base
requirement R˜t and surplus from the last compliance time (st).
sloped mechanism for x1 and x2 respectively. The intuition behind this alternative penalty regime
is that in the sloped region each SREC short of the full requirement should be penalized gradually
more and more until ADAPT finally starts to penalize each one at the full SACP. This construction
allows us to interpret the SACP function as a marginal demand curve, for which a total penalty
equal to the area under the curve must be paid.
The rules of the proposed ADAPT market can be summarized as follows.
• As usual, one SREC is issued per MWh to solar power generatators.
• The regulator sets SREC requirement levels for several years in the future. However, the
requirement levels can be automatically adapted to generation levels according to the market
performance in the last year. For example, in case of a surplus (shortage) in the last year,
requirements may be increased (decreased) according to a predefined formula.
• All Load Serving Entities (LSEs) must meet their requirement by submitting sufficient
SRECs each year, or else pay a penalty for each MWh they fall short. Penalties, however,
are calculated based on a sloped SACP function as in Figure 2; the more SRECs submitted,
the lower the penalty value per SREC (assuming being in the sloped region of the function).
• A generator or LSE can bank SRECs to the following year, effectively increasing their
penalty now and thus raising the value of the SRECs being submitted. This allows SREC
holders to more precisely balance the value of SRECs in the future against the price they
receive now, but only within a specified range (due to the limited lifetime of each SREC).
Example 1. Assume that the sloped SACP function is defined as represented in Figure 3 (the
left plot) and λ = 0.1. Let t = 14 and 15 represent the compliance times of EY2014 and EY2015
respectively. According to the values given in Table 1, the full requirement of the sloped mechanism
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(the right end of the sloped area) for EY2014 will be equal to
(1 + λ)R14 = 1, 878, 724.
Also the maximum (but not the effective) penalty P14 and P15 is equal to the current SACP lev-
els $339 and $331 respectively. Now assume that a total of b14 =2,000,000 banked SRECs are
available before the compliance time of EY2014 t = 14. Assume that all market participants col-
lectively submit xt = 1,800,000 SRECs to the regulators, and the remaining SRECs are banked
for the future. According to the sloped SACP function, for this aggregate amount of submission,
the SACP is equal to $78. This means market participants are obliged to pay a total amount of
0.5 × 78 × 78, 724 dollars. The remaining SRECs are banked because their expected future price
is higher than or equal to the penalty of $78. Note that in practice SACPs paid would be linked
to individual agents’ decisions and indeed each LSE faces its own individual requirement, but the
existence of the market to allow trading of SRECs up until compliance time should ensure that all
parties ultimately choose to pay the same penalty.
Here, total available SRECs at t = 14 exceeds the target R14 = 1, 707, 931. Let st represent this
surplus (or shortage if negative) from the last compliance time. In this case,
st = b14 −R14 = 292, 069, t ∈ (14, 15].
In an adaptive requirement scheme, we increase the requirement of the following year by a portion
of st (as shown in the right plot of Figure 3). For example, for α = 0.5, we obtain:
R15 = R˜15 + αs15 = 2, 071, 803 + 0.5× 292, 069 = 2, 217, 838,
where R˜15 is equal to the already announced requirement for EY2015 (from table 1). Note that in
the previous period we used R14 = R˜14, effectively assuming that s14 = 0.
4. Mathematical Model
We now develop a mathematical model of this mechanism to investigate the effects of the sloped
SACP function and adaptive requirements as well as other policy variations (and their combina-
tions), such as number of banking years. We use the following notation.
Indices (t, y): We index time by t, and energy or vintage year by y. In our implementation of the
model, the smallest time step is assumed to be a period of one month (i.e. ∆t = 112 ), matching the
observation frequency of NJ generation data. Each energy year y ∈ N is associated with the time
interval (y− 1, y], while t = y determines the compliance time of energy year y. For example, time
t = 6 corresponds to the end of energy year 2006 (May 31 2006). We use notation (pt,y)y, (bt,y)y
and (xt,y)y to represent vectors containing different SREC vintages.
Prices (pt,y)y: The market price at time t of an SREC of vintage year y, which is endogenously
determined via our dynamic programming approach, and is a function of the state variable.
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Parameters (T, τ, λ, α, R˜y , Py, r):
• T : The planning horizon or scheduled length of market existence (could also be ∞).
• τ : The maximum number of years (compliance times) that an SREC can be banked.
• λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1): The parameter determining the shape and slope of the SACP function (see
figure 3). If λ = 0, we obtain the current cliff policy.
• α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1): The parameter representing the portion of last year’s surplus (shortage) to
be added to (deducted from) the base requirement. If α = 0, this mechanism disappears.
• R˜y : Number of SRECs required for energy year y, determined by regulators in advance.
This, however, is not the effective requirement Ry, updated according to market perfor-
mance.
• Py : Maximum penalty per MWh for energy year y, set by regulators in advance.
• r: Interest rate.
State variables: The state variable St = ((bt,y)y, gˆt, st) is defined as follows.
• (bt,y)y : Total accumulated or banked SRECs from different vintages at time t. The total
banked SRECs available from all vintages is represented by b¯t =
∑⌈t⌉
y=max{1,⌈t⌉−τ} bt,y.
• gˆt : The installed capacity of SREC generation at time t.
• st : The surplus (or shortage) of SRECs from the last compliance time (st = b¯⌈t⌉−1−R˜⌈t⌉−1).
Note that st cannot always be obtained from (bt,y)y, e.g., in the case of a shortage (st ≤ 0).
Decision variables (xt,y)y: The number of SRECs to be submitted at compliance time t from
different vintages. We denote the total submitted SRECs at time t by x¯t =
∑⌈t⌉
y=max{1,⌈t⌉−τ} xt,y.
Decisions will be made by a policy π using a function Xπt (St) to be determined later.
Exogenous information processes (εt): The random variable indicative of noise in generation.
Let ω ∈ Ω be a sample path for (ε1, . . . , εT ). Let Ft = σ(ε1, . . . , εT ) be the sigma-algebra on Ω,
equipped with the filtration {Ft}t≥1, and let Q be the risk-neutral probability measure on (Ω,F),
giving us a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥1,Q). We assume throughout that any variable
indexed by t is Ft-measurable, and that all risk premiums are zero.
Other functions (Rt(st), f
SACP
t (x¯t)):
• Rt(st) : The number of SRECs required by the regulation at time t ∈ N,, defined as
Rt(st) = R˜t + αst
• fSACPt (x¯t) : The SACP function, determining the marginal penalty price for any value of
total SREC submission x¯t at time t. This is the (artificial) inverse demand function of
SRECs and at any compliance time (t ∈ N) it can be represented by (λ > 0):
fSACPt (x¯t) = max
(
0,min
[
Pt, Pt −
Pt
2λRt
(x¯t − (1− λ)Rt)
])
For other time periods t /∈ N, we define fSACPt (x¯t) = 0 and Rt(st) = 0, to provide a more general
model without the need to discriminate between compliance and non-compliance times.
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Transition function (SM): We represent this generically using St+∆t = S
M (St, (xt,y)y,Wt+∆t).
Variables gˆt+∆t and bt+∆t both depend on the SREC generation model, for which we follow the
approach of [8], supported by empirical evidence from New Jersey. The model consists of annual and
semi-annual seasonality, noise, and a price-dependent expected generation growth rate to capture
feedback onto new supply from current SREC prices. (More generally, [8] allow for dependence on
lagged SREC prices or historical average prices to reflect solar construction time, but for simplicity
and dimension reduction we use only current newest vintage prices.) The instantaneous generation
rate gt at each t is given by
(1) gt(p, εt) = gˆt exp
(
a1 sin(4πt) + a2 cos(4πt) + a3 sin(2πt) + a4 cos(2πt) + εt
)
.
while the related installed generation gˆt evolves according to
(2) gˆt+∆t = gˆt exp(a5∆t+ a6pt,⌈t⌉∆t).
The number of banked SRECs bt+∆t,y can be obtained from
bt+∆t,y =


0 y < ⌈t+∆t⌉ − τ,
bt,y − xt,y ⌈t+∆t⌉ − τ ≤ y < ⌈t+∆t⌉ ,
bt,y + gt∆t− xt,y y = ⌈t+∆t⌉ ,
0 y > ⌈t+∆t⌉ .
The four cases above correspond respectively to (i) vintages fully expired; (ii) older vintages still
trading; (iii) the most recent vintage; and (iv) vintages yet to exist. Between compliance dates bt,y
only changes for the current vintage as new SRECs are generated, while at compliance dates total
submissions for all existing vintages must be accounted for. Based on the definition of the SACP
function, no SRECs are submitted at non-compliance times (xt,y = 0 if t /∈ N).
Finally, surplus can be updated from
st+∆t =

b¯t − R˜t t ∈ N,st t /∈ N.
This is only a surplus (or shortage) relative to the base requirement schedule R˜t, set in advance.
Hence it is possible that st > 0 but the market is short of the adjusted target. ie. R˜t < b¯t < Rt.
Objective function: At each time step, the collective behaviour of a competitive market maxi-
mizes social welfare or equivalently here, minimizes total cost of compliance. Since the definition of
social welfare relies on integrating under an artificial demand function, we favour the compliance
cost minimization as the more natural approach, linking clearly to the individual banking decisions
of LSEs. Letting C(St, xt) denote the compliance cost function at time t, then we have
C(St, x¯t) =
∫ ∞
x¯t(St)
fSACPt (u)du.
In order to obtain cleaner equations, we use Ft(x¯t) to represent
∫∞
x¯t
fSACPt (u)du. Let Π be the set
of all policies π i.e. functions that match each state St to a decision X
π
t (St). The total cost of
10
future compliance Vt, under the best policy π ∈ Π, therefore satisfies
Vt(St) = min
π∈Π
Et
T∑
t′=t
e−r(t
′−t)Ft′(X
π
t′ (St′)),(3)
where e−r(t
′−t) is the discount factor, and Et is a time t conditional expectation under Q. We will
use the notation x¯⋆t for optimal total submission strategy (sum across vintages).
Note that we are assuming that the competitive equilibrium can be modelled directly via the
optimal decision of a single representative agent minimizing total costs. Much theory exists relating
such a decision to that of individual agents able to trade with each other in the market, for
example in the carbon market setting of [7] or [13], so we choose to avoid adding an additional
lengthy technical justification of this link here. Furthermore, we comment that an extension of
the model to incorporate other costs and decisions is possible. While the marginal cost of SREC
generation from existing solar installations is essentially zero, the upfront cost of installing new
solar could of course be modelled, effectively adding an additional decision variable (and greater
computational burden) to the problem. Instead, we choose to focus solely on the submission (or
banking) decision, and assume the construction of new solar follows (2), a simple price-feedback
relationship justified by empirical evidence in [8]. Furthermore, one might argue that some measure
of risk-aversion is important for both the banking and new investment decisions (given our premise
that excess volatility discourages investment), but we leave these additional challenges for future
work, simplifying the model sufficiently to facilitate the dynamic programming approach and to
gain insight into the key implications of the ADAPT policy proposal.
5. Model Properties
Through a series of theorems and propositions, we now derive several properties of the model
introduced in the previous section that help us in analysing the collective market behaviour and
solving the associated dynamic programming problem. We assume throughout that future penal-
ties Py are non-increasing in time, as has been the case (and typically decreasing) in all SRECs
markets to our knowledge and through all regulation changes in the NJ SREC market. (Note that
the jump upwards in 2008 in NJ was instead a sudden rule change and shift in the entire penalty
schedule.) We also assume λ > 0, since the optimal policy under the classical market design is
trivial (with non-increasing penalties), namely x¯⋆t = min(b¯t, Rt), submit all you can up to the ‘cliff’
and bank everything beyond.
The first helpful lemma reduces the dimensionality of the decision variable, by mapping the
optimal total submission x¯⋆t onto the submission decision for individual vintages, x
⋆
t,y:
Lemma 1. If the optimal number of submitted SRECs at time t, x¯⋆t , is known, the optimal number
submitted from the different existing non-expired vintages at time t is given by
x⋆t,y = min{bt,y, x¯
⋆
t −
y−1∑
u=⌈t⌉−τ
x⋆t,u}
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for any y such that ⌈t⌉ − τ ≤ y ≤ ⌈t⌉, and zero otherwise.
Proof. On one hand, all (non-expired) SREC vintages have the same impact on reducing the cost
function Ft(xt) at each time. On the other hand, the newer SRECs can be used further in the
future to minimize Et
∑
u e
−r(u−t)Fu(x¯
⋆
u). Therefore, for any y, if x
⋆
t,y < bt,y, x
⋆
t,y+1 = 0 (i.e. the
older SRECs must be submitted first). This means that the oldest SRECs must all be submitted
(x⋆
t,⌈t⌉−τ = bt,⌈t⌉−τ ) unless bt,⌈t⌉−τ > x¯
⋆
t . Therefore, x
⋆
t,⌈t⌉−τ = min{bt,⌈t⌉−τ , x¯
⋆
t }. Similarly, the
second oldest SRECs must all be submitted if this does not exceed the total remaining SRECs
from the optimal submission x¯⋆t , or x
⋆
t,⌈t⌉−τ+1 = min{bt,⌈t⌉−τ+1, x¯
⋆
t − x
⋆
t,⌈t⌉−τ}. Extending this to
other vintages ⌈t⌉− τ ≤ y ≤ ⌈t⌉, we obtain x⋆t,y = min{bt,y, x¯
⋆
t −
∑y−1
u=⌈t⌉−τ x
⋆
t,u}. Expired or not yet
produced SRECs of course cannot be submitted.

The simple and intuitive result above can be described as a ‘first in first out’ (FIFO) warehousing
rule, as would apply to any perishable commodity. While it crucially allows us to reduce the decision
variable to a scalar x¯t, the objective function (total discounted expected future costs), is still a
function of the full vector (bt,y)y contained in St, which can lead to cases where different vintage
SRECs have different values. Despite this warehousing concept, an SREC is a financial certificate,
and does not have any storage or delivery costs or other constraints related to physical commodities.
As such, standard no arbitrage arguments from finance theory apply, and SRECs must satisfy the
martingale condition under the risk-neutral measure (at all times including compliance dates, as
long as some are banked). At a compliance date non-expired SRECs must be worth at least as
much as the current penalty rate paid per SREC, and at optimality would be banked if discounted
expected future prices are higher. Expired SRECs have no value. Thus, the price of SRECs of
vintage y at time t satisfies
(4) pt,y = max{f
SACP
t (x¯
⋆
t ), e
−r∆tEt{pt+∆t,y}}, for t ≤ y + τ,
and pt,y = 0 for t > y + τ . Recall that f
SACP
t (xt) = 0 for non-compliance times (t /∈ N).
We note that the pricing equation closely resembles that of an American (or Bermudan) option,
which is very natural since SRECs are used (‘exercised’) at predetermined compliance dates, or else
expire. SREC prices in a competitive equilibrium can also be understood as the marginal benefit of
having an additional unit of that vintage (or the marginal cost of having one less). Unlike for the
discontinuous cliff policy, in the ADAPT policy (with λ > 0) we can equivalently use the derivative
of the total cost function, as described by the proposition below.
Proposition 1. The price of SRECs of vintage y at time t can be written as
pt,y =

−
∂Vt(St)
∂bt,y
, t ≤ y + τ,
0, t > y + τ.
(5)
Proof. Writing the objective function in (3) as
Vt(St) = min
π∈Π
{
Ft(X
π
t (St)) + e
−r∆tEt
T∑
t′=t+∆t
e−r(t
′−(t+∆t))Ft′(X
π
t′ (St′))
}
,
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we can see that an additional SREC will either be used to reduce the first term or the second
(depending on which is optimal). Therefore, differentiating with respect to bt,y (and noting that
vintage y is worthless after y + τ) returns precisely the price definition equation in (4). 
Next, to understand the optimal policy for x¯⋆t , we first need to prove the following lemmas. We
assume τ > 0 throughout, since otherwise there is no banking decision to make. The first lemma
describes the required price for any SREC vintages used for compliance.
Lemma 2. Let x¯⋆t = X
∗
t (St) represent the optimal policy at any compliance time t ∈ N. For any
vintage y such that x⋆t,y > 0, we must have pt,y = f
SACP(x¯⋆t ).
Proof. From (4), we know that pt,y ≥ f
SACP(x¯⋆t ). Suppose that pt,y > f
SACP(x¯⋆t ). Since we have
pt,y = −
∂Vt(St)
∂bt,y
by Proposition 1, we know an additional SREC (of vintage y) can reduce our
objective function by pt,y. Therefore it cannot be optimal to have submitted an SREC at SACP
level fSACP(x¯⋆t ), hence contradicting x
⋆
t,y > 0. (Intuitively, if the market price is higher than the
SACP, it’s better to sell the SREC in the market and pay a slightly higher penalty than to submit
it for compliance. This is not always true for the discontinuous cliff policy.) 
The next lemma applies between compliance dates and for SREC vintages not submitted.
Lemma 3. For any vintage y such that x⋆t,y = 0, we must have pt,y = e
−r∆tEt{pt+∆t,y}.
Proof. The total future compliance cost function can be written
Vt(St) = min
π∈Π
{
Ft(X
π
t (St)) + e
−r∆tEt
T∑
t′=t+∆t
e−r(t
′−(t+∆t))Ft′(X
π
t′ (St′))
}
.
Since x⋆t,y = 0, we know that Ft(X
π
t (St)) is not a function of bt,y, and hence
∂Vt(St)
∂bt,y
= e−r∆t
∂
∂bt,y
min
π∈Π
Et
T∑
t′=t+∆t
e−r(t
′−t)Ft′(X
π
t′ (St′)) = e
−r∆tEt
[
∂Vt+∆t(St+∆t)
∂bt,y
]
Thus, by Proposition 1, pt,y = e
−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y]. 
Finally, consider the case of an SREC vintage reaching the end of its usable life.
Lemma 4. At vintage y’s expiry (at t = y + τ), if bt,y > 0, then x
⋆
t,y = bt,y and pt,y = f
SACP(x¯⋆t ).
Proof. By definition, pt+∆t,y = 0 at t = y+ τ , so any remaining SRECs will expire worthless if not
used at t. Since F is strictly non-increasing in x¯t, submitting additional SRECs can only reduce
one’s costs, so x⋆t,y = bt,y must be optimal (noting however that any submission beyond (1 + λ)Rt
would no longer have any impact on the objective function). 
The result above clearly implies that at any t ∈ N, the optimal submission decision lies in the
range x¯⋆t ∈ [bt,t−τ , b¯t]. We can now prove the main theorem describing how price dynamics are
linked to submission and banking decisions, starting directly from the optimization problem.
Theorem 1. Let x¯⋆t = X
∗
t (St) represent the optimal policy at any compliance time t ∈ N. Then
fSACP(x¯⋆t ) = max
(
fSACP(b¯t),min
(
fSACP(bt,t−τ ), e
−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y˜]
))
,
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where y˜ = max{y : x⋆t,y > 0}.
Proof. Proof. Throughout this proof we use the notation bt, xt and gt to denote the vectors
containing all vintages (noting that for gt only the current vintage is non-zero).
Vt(bt, ·) = min
π∈Π
Et
T∑
t′=t+∆t
e−r(t
′−(t+∆t))Ft′(X
π
t′ (St′))(6)
= min
x¯t∈[bt,t−τ ,b¯t]
(
Ft(x¯t) + e
−r∆tEt [Vt+∆t(bt − xt + gt∆t, ·)]
)
.(7)
Now we look at the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of this constrained maximization
(with two constraints, so we introduce KKT multipliers µ1 and µ2). Since
dF (x¯t)
dx¯t
= −fSACP(x¯t),
the stationarity condition (with optimal solution denoted by x¯⋆t ) gives:
−fSACP(x¯⋆t ) + e
−r∆t ∂
∂x¯t
Et [Vt+∆t(bt − xt + gt∆t, ·)]|x¯t=x¯⋆t
= µ1 − µ2
while the complementary slackness conditions give
µ1(x¯
⋆
t − b¯t) = 0 and µ2(bt,t−τ − x¯
⋆
t ) = 0.
Also, bt,t−τ ≤ x¯
⋆
t ≤ b¯t and µ1, µ2 ≥ 0. Thus if bt,t−τ < x¯
⋆
t < b¯t, then µ1 = µ2 = 0, so
−fSACP(x¯⋆t ) + e
−r∆t ∂
∂x¯t
Et [Vt+∆t(bt − xt + gt∆t, ·)]|x¯t=x¯⋆t
= 0
or equivalently, since Lemma 1 tells us that derivatives with respect to x¯t correspond to derivatives
with respect to the most recent vintage used for submission,
fSACP(x¯⋆t ) = −e
−r∆tEt
[
∂
∂x⋆t,y˜
Vt+∆t(bt − xt + gt∆t, ·)
]
where y˜ = max{y : x⋆t,y > 0}. Thus, if bt,t−τ < x¯
⋆
t < b¯t, then using Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 for
any submitted vintage y (i.e. such that x⋆t,y > 0),
pt,y = e
−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y˜] .
Overall, for any t ∈ N, we must have
(x¯⋆t − b¯t)(x¯
⋆
t − bt,t−τ )
(
pt,y − e
−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y˜]
)
= 0
and since fSACP(·) is a strictly non-increasing function, we can conclude that
fSACP(x¯⋆t ) = max
(
fSACP(b¯t),min
(
fSACP(bt,t−τ ), e
−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y˜]
))
.

We can also link the optimal policy x¯⋆t with that of the following compliance date, x¯
⋆
t+1:
Corollary 1. Let x¯⋆t = X
∗
t (St) represent the optimal policy at any t ∈ N. Then,
fSACP(x¯⋆t ) = max
(
fSACP(b¯t),min
(
fSACP(bt,t−τ ), e
−rEt
[
fSACP(x¯⋆t+1)
]))
.
Proof. To extend the theorem above to the corollary, we need to show that
e−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y˜] = e
−rEt
[
fSACP(x¯⋆t+1)
]
,
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where y˜ = max{y : x⋆t,y > 0}. First note that e
−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y˜] = e
−rEt [pt+1,y˜] by Lemma 3 since
x¯⋆t = 0 for t /∈ N (i.e. the martingale condition). Now there are two cases to consider:
(i) x⋆t,y˜ < bt,y˜: Since Rt+1 > 0 and Pt+1 ≥ Pu ∀u > t + 1 by assumption, we can deduce that
x⋆t+1,y˜ > 0 (i.e. at least some of the remaining SRECs of vintage y˜ will be used for compliance), as
we know the first of these will reduce the total cost function by Pt+1, a larger number than possible
in any future year. Thus, by Lemma 1, pt+1,y˜ = f
SACP(x¯⋆t+1).
(ii) x⋆t,y˜ = bt,y˜: As no SRECs of vintage y˜ remain beyond time t, pt+1,y˜ is a hypothetical price in
the event of suboptimal banking. Nonetheless, we can still claim that pt+1,y˜ = f
SACP(x¯⋆t+1) must
hold by Lemma 1 in such a case. 
The theorem and corollary above describe the three possible cases at a submission time t ∈
N: undersupply, (severe) oversupply, and normal conditions. In the first case, x¯⋆t = b¯t (since
fSACP(x¯⋆t ) = f
SACP(b¯t)), so all available SRECs are submitted in order to reduce penalties as much
as possible. In the second case, only the oldest vintage is submitted (x⋆t,y = bt,y) in order to avoid
SRECs expiring worthless. Given τ = 4 as in New Jersey, this oversupply case is particularly
extreme and unlikely, as it would imply that all five vintages still exist in the market, and moreover
that bt,t−4 is a large enough number that it would not be optimal to use any of bt,t−3. Finally, the
most typical case of bt,t−τ < x¯
⋆ < b¯t is between these extremes, with some SRECs submitted and
others saved in order to balance with their expected future value.
In all three cases, Lemma 2 tells us that pt,y = f
SACP(x¯⋆t ) for all vintages y with x
⋆
t,y > 0.
In the undersupply case (pt,y = f
SACP(b¯t) for all vintages), all existing SRECs are submitted,
so Et[pt+∆t,y˜] arguably does not exist, since none of the current vintages will trade next period.
However, if (suboptimally) any SRECs remained in the market, their future price would drop. In
the extreme oversupply case (pt,t−τ = f
SACP(bt,t−τ ) for the only submitted vintage), other vintages
may have higher prices given by their continuation value, as in Corollary 1. Finally, in the common
case, all vintages y ≥ y˜ will typically have prices equal to e−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y˜], the continuation value
of the newest vintage submitted, but it is theoretically possible that other vintages y > y˜ can exist
with higher prices. We now derive another representation of the price pt,y that can help provide
further intuition, showing that an SREC’s value is the maximum over its compliance cost impact
at all future exercise opportunities for which x⋆t,y > 0 optimally:
Proposition 2. Let x¯⋆t = X
∗
t (St) represent the optimal policy at any compliance time t ∈ N. The
price of SRECs of vintage y at time t can be written
pt,y = max
u∈{⌈t⌉,⌈t⌉+1,...,⌈t⌉+τ}
Et
[
e−r(u−t)fSACP(x¯⋆u)1{xu,y>0}
]
.
Proof. For t ∈ (y+ τ − 1, y+ τ ], we have no further banking decisions remaining for vintage y, and
from Lemmas 3 and 4, we must have
pt,y = e
−r(y+τ−t)Et
[
fSACP(x¯⋆y+τ )
]
.
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At t = y + τ − 1, using Corollary 1 and Lemmas 2 and 3, we then have:
pt,y =

f
SACP(x¯⋆t ), if x
⋆
t,y > 0
e−rEt
[
fSACP(x¯⋆y+τ )
]
≥ fSACP(x¯⋆t ), if x
⋆
t,y = 0.
By repeating this argument iteratively back in time we obtain the result. 
The possibility of different prices for different vintages introduces a high dimensional state vari-
able. However, investigations of realistic scenarios reveal that it is very likely for all vintages to
have the same price, allowing us to approximate the problem by a much lower dimensional one
with b¯t as state variable. Using Proposition 2, we can show that for any neighbouring vintages y
and y+1, pt,y < pt,y+1 is possible if and only if there exists some positive probability that we have
an excess of vintage y SRECs to dispose of at their expiry.
Theorem 2. Let x¯⋆t = X
∗
t (St) be the optimal policy, and Qt the conditional probability at t. If
Qt {x¯
⋆
u = bu,u−τ} = 0, ∀u ∈ {⌈t⌉, ⌈t⌉ + 1, . . . , ⌈t⌉ + τ},
then all SREC vintages have equal prices at time t. (i.e. pt,u = pt,v,∀u, v ∈ {⌈t⌉, . . . , ⌈t⌉ − τ}).
Proof. Assume Qt {x¯
⋆
u = bu,u−τ > 0} = 0, ∀u ∈ {⌈t⌉, ⌈t⌉ + 1, . . . , ⌈t⌉ + τ}. Now suppose (for a
contradiction) that pt,y < pt,y+1 for some y ∈ {⌈t⌉ − 1, . . . , ⌈t⌉ − τ}, noting that pt,y > pt,y+1 is
precluded by no arbitrage since newer vintages give all the benefits of older ones plus more.
From Proposition 2, we can deduce that there must exist some paths A ∈ Ω with Qt{A} > 0
such that for some u˜ ∈ {⌈t⌉, ⌈t⌉ + 1, . . . , y + τ + 1} we have xu˜,y = 0, xu˜,y+1 > 0 and pu˜,y < pu˜,y+1.
However, if u˜ ≤ y+ τ (i.e., before vintage y expires), we can show a contradiction: firstly if bu˜,y > 0
for A ∈ Ω, then xu˜,y = 0, xu˜,y+1 > 0 contradicts Lemma 1; alternatively, if bu˜,y = 0, then the
‘hypothetical’ price pu˜,y = f
SACP(x¯⋆u˜) still holds, which equals pu˜,y+1, again a contradiction.
This proves that no price difference can stem from the earlier compliance dates and we must
have u˜ = y + τ + 1, for which 0 = pu˜,y < pu˜,y+1 for paths A ∈ Ω, since vintage y has expired.
However this is not necessarily sufficient to lead to pt,y < pt,y+1. We know from Lemma 4 that
at time y + τ , x¯⋆y+τ ≥ by+τ,y. Suppose that x¯
⋆
y+τ > by+τ,y. Then by Lemma 1, xy+τ,y+1 > 0 and
py+τ,y = py+τ,y+1, again contradicting the assumed price difference between vintages. Therefore
the only remaining possibility is that x¯⋆y+τ = by+τ,y for paths A ∈ Ω, in which case from Corollary
1, we can have py+τ,y = f
SACP(x¯⋆y+τ ) < e
−rEy+τ
[
fSACP(x¯⋆y+τ+1)
]
= py+τ,y+1. This event was ruled
out at the start of our proof, producing a contradiction which completes the proof. The extension
of the claim from neighbouring vintages y and y + 1 to any non-expired vintages is trivial. 
A simpler sufficient (far from necessary) condition for price convergence across vintages is
x¯⋆t >
t−1∑
y=t−τ
bt,y, ∀t ∈ N
as it then guarantees that x⋆t,t > 0 (i.e., at least some of the newest vintage SRECs are submitted).
Recalling Figure 1b, we note that at the peak of oversupply in the New Jersey market (2012-13),
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banked certificates still remained between 40% and 50% of the following year’s requirement, sug-
gesting that the newest vintage would always be needed for compliance, easily enough to equalize
prices, even with a significantly positive λ under ADAPT (since with non-increasing penalties it is
always optimal to submit at least (1−λ)Rt SRECs). Recall that the natural feedback effect in the
market naturally serves to avoid the most extreme imbalances since new generation slows during
oversupply, and accelerates during undersupply.
On the other hand, price differences between vintages are fairly common for the cliff policy (e.g.,
Figure 1a) so it is not immediately intuitive how the sloped policy eliminates such differences in
all but extreme scenarios. We provide an illustrative toy example below:
Example 2. Let r = 0. Suppose also we have no randomness in the model (ǫt = 0), and perfect
foresight on future SREC supply. Set τ = 1 so that (at most) two vintages are available at any
time. Vintage 0 expires in year 1, and vintage 1 in year 2. Requirements are R1 = R2 = 10, 000,
and penalties P1 = P2 = P . The banked certificates available by the end of year 1 are
b1,0 = 8, 000, b1,1 = 6, 000
and we know that next year we will also have some vintage 2 SRECs available:
b2,2 = 5, 000
We consider the optimal submission decisions for year 1 and year 2 to minimize total cost, firstly
under the case of the cliff policy, and secondly for ADAPT’s sloped policy (with λ = 0.1).
(1) Cliff Policy: In Year 1, 14,000 SRECs are available, so 10,000 can be used to meet the first
requirement, with 4,000 banked to Year 2. Since no penalty is paid, p1,0 = 0. Then only
9,000 will be available for Year 2 compliance, so R2 will be missed, and thus p1,1 = P , the
penalty. The total payments for non-compliance (over the two years) are 1, 000P .
(2) ADAPT Policy (λ = 0.1): Suppose we choose to submit (1+λ)R1 in Year 1 to reduce our
penalty to zero. Then we would submit 11,000 in Year 1, leaving only 8,000 for Year 2 and
a total penalty of 2, 000P (the area
∫ 11000
8000 f
SACP(x)). Prices are again p1,0 = 0, p1,1 = P
in this (suboptimal) case. Instead, the optimal policy (ignoring Year 3 and beyond) is to
spread our compliance costs between years, by submitting 9,500 SRECs each of the two
years. The two vintage prices are then equal at p1,0 = p1,1 = 0.75P , and the total penalty
payment each year is 1, 500(0.75P )/2, giving a combined value of 1, 125P .
While the total penalty of 1, 125P under ADAPT is slightly higher than the 1, 000P under the cliff
policy, it is significantly lower than the 2, 000P under the naive policy of lowering the first year’s
penalty to zero at the expense of the second. We clearly see the incentive for market participants
to balance their banking decisions with future price expectations, and the resulting equalization of
vintage prices. Note that in a more complete example, the feedback effect should also be included
such that the future generation of SRECs (b2,2, say) should change as current prices (linked to
current decisions) change. Similarly, with α > 0 under ADAPT, the future requirement would also
respond to earlier decisions. However, these additional effects would not change the overall features
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of the comparison being made above.
Note also that the inventory of SRECs in this simple example has more of the older vintages
remaining than newer ones, an unrealistic scenario both because of Lemma 1 and because of the
growth of generation in most markets. Even still, prices across vintages are equal. One would have
to change the balance to b1,0 = 9, 501, b1,1 = 4, 499 before a price difference would emerge, because
it would no longer be optimal to only submit 9,500 in year 1 (and waste one SREC).
In other words, a price difference can only emerge if the optimal submission decision xt, needed
to balance today’s penalty with expected future prices, would fall below the bound bt,t−τ either this
period or with some probability in a future period. In such a case, it is instead preferable to submit
bt,t−τ to avoid wasting SRECs, thus bringing down the price of the expiring vintage compared to
newer ones. In line with the example above, the following theorem shows that the total penalty
payment is always more under the sloped market design.
Theorem 3. Total penalty payment of the sloped market design is always greater than or equal to
that paid under the original step mechanism.
Proof. Let x¯⋆t denote the total submitted SRECs at time t ∈ N under the optimal policy for the
ADAPT regime. Let FADAPTt (x¯t) and F
Cliff
t (x¯t) represent total compliance costs at each t under
each regime, for a policy x¯t. Consider the two possible cases for x¯
⋆
t , for any t ∈ N:
(i) If x¯⋆t ≥ Rt, we have
FClifft (x¯
⋆
t ) =
∫ ∞
x¯⋆t
fClifft (z)dz = 0 ≤
∫ ∞
xt
fADAPTt (z)dz = F
ADAPT
t (x¯
⋆
t ).
(ii) If 0 ≤ x¯⋆t ≤ Rt, we have
∫ x¯⋆t
0 f
Cliff
t (z)dz ≥
∫ x¯⋆t
0 f
ADAPT
t (z)dz. Since by construction the total
areas under the two penalty functions are equal (
∫∞
0 f
Cliff
t (z)dz =
∫∞
0 f
ADAPT
t (z)dz), we conclude
FClifft (x¯
⋆
t ) =
∫ ∞
x¯⋆t
fClifft (z)dz ≤
∫ ∞
xt
fADAPTt (z)dz = F
ADAPT
t (x¯
⋆
t ).
Finally, let x˜⋆t , be the optimal policy for the step regime. From (3), for any state St,
V Clifft (St, x˜
⋆
t ) ≤ V
Cliff
t (St, x¯
⋆
t ).
where V Clifft (St, xt) or V
ADAPT
t (St, xt) represent the total future cost function under a given regime
when following strategy xt from state St onwards, where xt may or may not be optimal. Noting
from the two cases above that for any t, FClifft (x¯
⋆
t ) ≤ F
ADAPT
t (x¯
⋆
t ), we have as required,
V Clifft (St, x˜
⋆
t ) ≤ V
ADAPT
t (St, x¯
⋆
t ).

6. Algorithm for Solving the Model
The original dynamic programming model is computationally intractable due to the dimension-
ality of the state variable. However, we can reduce the dimensionality, preserving the structure and
behavior of the problem yet producing a model that can be solved exactly.
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Specifically, the number of dimensions can be reduced greatly by using the scalar b¯t, giving the
aggregate number of banked SRECs, instead of the vector (bt,y)y which captures the banking by
vintage. The vintage-specific values appear in the result
pt,y = max
(
fSACP(b¯t),min
(
fSACP(bt,t−τ ), e
−r∆tEt [pt+∆t,y˜]
))
, ∀y such that x⋆t,y > 0,
where y˜ = max{y : x⋆t,y > 0}, but are only relevant if the number of older SRECs that are about
to expire is very large at some t ∈ N. This is quite unlikely to happen in reality (in fact, for
τ = 4, bt,t−τ = 0 is virtually guaranteed), specifically because the oldest SRECs are the first to be
submitted at each compliance time (by Lemma 1). Therefore, when generating our price surfaces,
we find the function Vt in terms of the scalar b¯t, with transition function given by
b¯t+∆t = b¯t + gt∆t− x¯
⋆
t .
However, as we simulate forwards in numerical experiments later, we retain the full vector (bt,y)y,
allowing us to continually check if our dimension reduction is valid. Experiments with τ = 4 and
our chosen paremeters (see next section) reveal no contradiction of the assumption.
Assuming P{x¯⋆t = bt,t−τ} = 0 (as in Theorem 2), Corollary 1 implies that f
SACP
t (x¯
⋆
t ) =
max{fSACPt (b¯t), e
−rEt[f
SACP
t+1 (x¯
⋆
t+1)]} and Theorem 1 then gives,
(8) fSACPt (x¯
⋆
t ) = max{f
SACP
t (b¯t), e
−r∆tEt[pt+∆t,y˜]},
where y˜ = max{y : x⋆t,y > 0}. Given our dimension reduction (collapsing bt,y and x
⋆
t,y to b¯t and x¯
⋆
t ),
y˜ is not observable when solving for the price of some vintage y. However, Theorem 2 allows us to
replace y˜ by y. Thus, the optimal x¯⋆t can be obtained from
(9) x¯⋆t = min{b¯t, (f
SACP)−1t (e
−r∆tEt[pt+∆t,y])}
Note that because Pt is non-increasing in time, at any time t ∈ N the expected future price is
no larger than the maximum penalty at time t
(
Et[pt+∆t,ymaxt ] ≤ Pt
)
. Thus, e−r∆tEt[pt+∆t,ymaxt ] ≤
Et[pt+∆t,ymaxt ] is in the sloped area of f
SACP
t and therefore (f
SACP)−1t is defined.
This means we can solve our dynamic program via SREC prices (and the martingale property)
instead of the original objective function. This simplifies calculations at each time step and directly
outputs SREC prices. From the fundamental property of prices in (4), we obtain,
(10) pt,y = exp(−r∆t)Et[pt+∆t,y], t /∈ N,
and at the compliance dates (t ∈ N), we have
(11) pt,y = max{f
SACP
t (x¯
⋆
t ), exp(−r∆t)Et[pt+∆t,y]}, t ∈ N.
We can use equations (9), (10), and (11) to compute the SREC prices using backward induction on
a discretized state space. We solve the dynamic program for each vintage in turn, using differents
grids and starting with the newest vintage ymax each year due to its assumed role in driving the
price feedback. We compute the price surfaces according to the following algorithm.
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(1) Discretize the state variable St = (bt, gˆt, st) on a grid ranging over [0, κ
bRy+τ ], [0, κ
gRy+τ ],
and [−κsRy+τ , κ
sRy+τ ] respectively for each vintage year y, where κ
b, κg > 1 (e.g. 1.5), and
κs > 0 (e.g. 0.5). Also discretize the distribution of the noise variable εt into n outcomes
εt,i with probability pr{εt,i}, for i = 1, . . . , n.
(2) Initialize the dynamic program by calculating p
T,yfin
= fSACPT (b¯T ) at all grid points, where
yfin denotes the final SREC vintage in our study, and T = yfin + τ .
(3) Go backward through time and compute prices of all (possibly existing) SREC vintages
(ymint , . . . , y
max
t ) from (10) and (11) at each grid point (b¯t, gˆt, st):
(a) If t /∈ N, x˜t = 0, otherwise find x˜t by solving f
SACP
t (x˜t) = e
−r∆tEt{pt+∆t,ymaxt |x˜t}:
(i) Set x˜t = (1 + λ)Rt; at this point f
SACP
t (x˜t) = 0.
(ii) xt = min{x˜t, b¯t}
(iii) pt,ymaxt = max{f
SACP
t (x˜t), f
SACP
t (b¯t)}.
(iv) From (2) gˆt+∆t = gˆt exp(a5∆t+ a6pt,ymax∆t);
(v) For each i = 1, . . . , n from (1)
gt+∆t,i = gˆt+∆t exp
(
a1 sin(4π(t +∆t)) + a2 cos(4π(t +∆t))
+a3 sin(2π(t+∆t)) + a4 cos(2π(t +∆t)) + εt,i
)
.
(vi) b¯t+∆t,i = b¯t + gt+∆t,i∆t− xt.
(vii) st+∆t = b¯t − R˜t.
(viii) Using the discretized distribution function
Et[pt+∆t,ymaxt ] =
n∑
i=1
pr{εt,i}pt+∆t,ymaxt
(
b¯t+∆t,i, gˆt+∆t, st+∆t
)
.
(ix) If fSACPt (x˜t) < e
−r∆tEt{pt+∆t,ymax
t+∆t
}, update x˜t to x˜t − k with k > 0, and go to
(ii).
(b) Set x¯⋆t = min{b¯t, x˜t}, and compute b¯t+∆t, gˆt+∆t, and st+∆t as of (a iii) to (a vi)
equations.
(c) For y : ymaxt to y
min
t
(i) Calculate Et[pt+∆t,y] =
∑n
i=1 pr{εt,i}pt+∆t,y
(
b¯t+∆t, gˆt+∆t, st+∆t
)
.
(ii) pt,y = max{f
SACP
t (x¯
⋆
t ), e
−r∆tEt{pt+∆t,y}}.
CPU times for solving over a decade (with an acceptable level of accuracy) with a single fine-
grained grid are excessive (on the order of several weeks). As our state variables (e.g. generation)
lie on different ranges for early and late years, we can use separate smaller grids for different vintage
years (as given in step 1 above) instead of a single large grid. The grid size dynamically changes
according to the requirement level. Going forward in time, we need to convert any point from an
earlier year grid to the corresponding point in the newer year. This maintains the same level of
accuracy, while keeping the problem computationally tractable. Experiments were run for 50 to
100 grid points for each state variable for each vintage year, and this was found to produce an
acceptable tradeoff between accuracy and CPU times.
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a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 σ
10.9558 -0.1209 0.0900 0.2151 0.3859 -0.0151 1.27×10−3 0.186
Table 2. Estimated parameters for our linear model
7. Experiments
To gain insight into the effects of different SREC policies, we must first choose some reasonable
parameters for the current market design to serve as our benchmark. We use (τ = 4) and values
R˜t, Pt given in Table 1 (based on the latest regulation changes in NJ), along with a sharp cliff
and non-adaptive requirements, corresponding to λ = 0, α = 0. We fix r = 2%, but note that the
interest rate has little impact on our results. The parameters for the generation model (for gt) are
taken directly from [8] (and shown in Table 2), obtained by fitting a linear model to the log of the
historical generation. The noise term satisfies ǫt ∼ N (0, 0.186).
We now report on experiments designed to provide insights into the effect of different market
designs. We first assume a steady growth in targets, a strategy that ensures that SREC prices do
not rapidly fall towards zero. For this purpose, we set Ry = α exp{β(y − 14)}, with α = R14, the
EY2014 requirement level and β > 0 (β = 0.35 in the following experiments).
7.1. The slope of the SACP function. There are several critical differences between ADAPT
and the current market mechanism. If total banked SRECs are less than the requirement under the
step mechanism, they clearly should all be submitted, as Pt is a decreasing sequence, such that the
current penalty is more than any possible future price. In contrast, under ADAPT participants can
choose the submission value to balance prices before and after submission (to minimize compliance
costs). This additional flexibility typically results in equal prices across vintages under ADAPT.
Furthermore, even for a small positive λ (producing a very steep SACP function), extreme prices
near zero or Pt are rare, only happening if the total banked SRECs are either very high or very
low.
Figure 4 compares SREC prices (of various vintage years) between a stepped and sloped SACP
mechanism, by simulating forwards through time and pulling prices from the appropriate surfaces
(interpolating when necessary). The top row shows twenty sample paths, while the bottom averages
over 10,000 simulations with 100 grid points for each state variable gˆt and bt (the price feedback
parameter a6 is 7 × 10
−4). To obtain a meaningful comparison in which price volatility can be
easily observed, we need prices that are not too high or too low. Therefore, we do not attempt
to match our initial conditions to the market, and instead we use gˆ13 = R14 exp(−β) and b¯13 = 0,
which results in mid to high initial prices.
Figure 4 shows that the cliff policy (λ = 0) not only produces greater price drops for submitted
SRECs (which may then no longer exist), but also far more volatile prices generally. We note that
since our initial conditions lead to initial prices fairly near Pt for the cliff policy, a centered tilt
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Figure 4. SREC prices in 8 year simulation with λ = 0, 0.1, and 0.3 (left to right):
20 price sample paths (top row) and average over 10000 simulations (bottom row).
under ADAPT tends to shift initial prices downwards towards mid-range levels. Low initial prices
would be likely to rise under ADAPT. The bottom row in Figure 4 also reveals that there was no
price difference between SRECs of different vintages when using a sloped SACP (λ > 0), as ex-
pected given results from Section 5. Both of these observations indicate that the sloped mechanism
provides a safer and more attractive environment for investment in solar power. These figures show
that price volatility decreases substantially as λ increases, especially from 0 to 0.1 when a slope is
first introduced. Under ADAPT, an equilibrium can typically form between the price of SRECs
before and after compliance. This is because if the price after compliance is expected to be higher,
a firm would prefer to bank more, accepting a higher penalty today while reducing the price of
SRECs in the future, until these tradeoffs balance.
However, price levels do not necessarily follow, and in this example even appear to fall slightly.
This is logical for the case of tilting a slope when the market is closer to undersupply than over-
supply, as is the case here. Keeping R fixed, increasing λ corresponds to imposing a higher total
payment on society, as Theorem 3 suggests. However, one could also introduce a slight decrease in
R when increasing λ (since the effective full requirement is (1 + λ)R) in order to counteract higher
compliance costs, but then also lowering price levels. One might seek a balance between higher
payments and less volatility. It seems that the main goal of making solar energy more attractive for
investment can be achieved by a market mechanism that produces relatively high and less volatile
prices with no price difference between various vintages. Our analysis suggests that an ADAPT
mechanism with even a small positive λ can provide these significant benefits, without a major
impact on the total cost of compliance.
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7.2. Adaptive requirements. A challenge faced by policy makers is the design of a fixed target
schedule, which appears to require forecasting a highly uncertain rate of market adoption many
years in advance, as well as technological changes, economic conditions and other behavioral factors.
In line with Massachusetts’ innovative adaptive SREC requirement, or the EU’s upcoming adaptive
carbon cap (the MSR), we can circumvent this problem by allowing the requirements to adapt to
the current generation level. In our model, we use a combination of fixed and adaptive rules:
Ry = R˜y + α (by−1 − R˜y−1), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, y ∈ N.
As described in Section 3, according to this mechanism, there are two sets of requirements: the
base requirement level R˜y fixed in advance, and the adaptive requirement Ry, computed when a
portion of last year’s surplus (shortage) is added to (deducted from) the known base R˜y. One may
expect that such an adaptive mechanism can yield less volatile prices in the long-term by helping
to enforce a balanced growth for generation and requirement levels.
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Figure 5. 20 price sample paths for an 8 year simulation with (λ, α)-tuples (0,0),
(0,0.5), and (0.3,0.5).
As discussed earlier in Section 4, modeling a market design with adaptive requirements requires
one extra dimension in our dynamic program. Although this extra dimension increases the com-
putational time significantly (from around one hour to around a week with 50 grid points for each
dimension), we still are able to solve this problem using an exact dynamic programming approach.
Figure 5 investigates the impact of the adaptive mechanism (for α = 0.5), both without a slope
(λ = 0) and in conjunction with the slope (λ = 0.3). According to these results, an adaptive cliff
policy also reduces price volatility and avoids the risk of very low SREC prices in comparison with
a simple cliff policy (the current mechanism). Adaptive requirements, however, appear to reduce
the price volatility less than a simple sloped policy, while also counteracting some of the effect
of the slope when used in conjuction (compare with the λ = 0.3, α = 0 case in Figure 4). This
final potentially counterintuitive result can be explained by the weakening effect that α > 0 has on
the ability of a banking decision to lower future expected prices, a mechanism central to the price
stabilizing impact of the slope.
Figure 6 shows SREC prices for 20 sample paths of another experiment on a sloped policy
(λ = 0.3) with and without adaptive requirements (α = 0, α = 0.5, and α = 1). In this experiment
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Figure 6. 20 sample paths for original requirements and α = 0, 0.5, 1 respectively
(λ = 0.3, gˆ13 = R14 exp(−β))
the original NJ requirement schedule is used, and thus the rate of generation growth is not in line
with the rate of requirement growth. The adaptive requirement mechanism (α = 0.5) delays the
rate of convergence to zero for a couple of years, but it cannot completely stop it. This can be
better explained if we refer to the case with α = 1. When α = 1, any value of positive surplus
would be added to the requirement of the next year, and this would fully neutralize the effect
of accumulating banked SRECs. However, the long-term rate of capacity growth remains above
the requirement growth rate and thus prices fall to zero but slower in comparison with the cases
of α = 0 and 0.5. The short-term price variability increases because adaptivity counteracts the
smoothing effect of banking, as we discuss in the next section.
All in all, although the adaptive requirements can increase price volatility, they can also, to
some extent, correct a lack of long-term foresight by policymakers in predicting the rate of capacity
growth. This can reduce (but may not eliminate) the need for regulatory fixes, by providing an
additional option in the regulator’s toolkit, but as we have seen, care should be taken in combining
such policies strategically.
7.3. More banking years. In addition to requirement changes, another strategy chosen by the
regulators during the lifetime of the NJ SREC market has been increasing the number of banking
years. This simple strategy firstly ensures higher SREC prices as a result of extra years of validity.
Secondly, this can stabilize prices from falling too low, by striking a balance among different energy
years.
Figure 7 shows the results of an experiment on the number of banking years. Note that at
each time, different SREC vintages may exist. The same colors of lines are used for each vintage,
however, the lines with higher prices correspond to newer vintages. According to this figure, the
difference between the 10th and the 90th percentile of SREC prices of the newer vintages, which
are the majority of SRECs at each time, decreases with a higher number of banking years. For
example, with five years of lifetime, prices of the majority of SRECs (zero or one year old SRECs)
are much less volatile than those with one or three years of lifetime.
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Figure 7. The mean, 10th and 90th percentiles of SREC prices for 10000 simula-
tions with 1, 3, and 5 years of lifetime (from left to right), with λ = 0, α = 0) and
each vintage plotted separately.
8. Conclusion
The current SREC market design produces volatile prices which reduces the attractiveness of
this market for investment. This itself creates other problems such as reducing competitiveness of
the market and therefore inefficiency in SREC generation. We propose the ADAPT policy which
uses a sloped SACP function. We develop a dynamic programming model in order to predict
collective market behaviour, and we derive and prove some of the properties of this market such
as the collective SREC submission policy. We then use this submission policy and other market
properties in a pricing model that enables us to compare the performance of different market designs
in terms of price level and volatility. The results of our experiments show that the ADAPT policy
(particularly the sloped SACP function) can significantly mitigate the risk of sudden price drops
and high volatility, thus ensuring greater market stability and reliability in the long run.
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